Friday, October 24, 2014

Thoughts on Strategic Agility and Arctic Strategy

I Played Too Many Strategy Games as a Kid

One of the most interesting things about strategy, and I'm talking about it from a general perspective as an overarching plan to accomplish a goal over a long time period, is how it is formed, and, in the case of the Arctic, if it is suitable for the many changes coming or if it will become obsolete quickly. A couple of months ago I came across an article called Governments for the Future: Building the Strategic and Agile State by Mikko Kosonen and Yves Doz from SITRA (The Finnish Innovation Fund).

It basically outlined that traditional governance models are not suitable for the types of complex problems beginning to emerge in the world, and how they need to change to respond with better strategies. It didn't specifically mention the Arctic but I think this is ultra relevant, because the Arctic is something of a lab for new governance models as climate change is moving faster there than other places. The complex problems of globalization and climate change, and the revealed inadequacies of the old state system to deal with them are nowhere more apparent than in the Arctic. And this is another interesting thing about strategies, which traditional thinking would relegate as set plans to deal with set problems, that they will in the future be defined more by how they can deal with changing situations, according to SITRA.

SITRA has a few solutions for how governments can change their old models for the future. Part of the problem is that governments are more often quite decentralized, and show little inter-agency unity. In fact, the nature of budgeting has locked up resources and incentivized turf wars between bureaucratic units, ensuring that money can't be quickly redirected to new problems. What's more these agencies often don't seek out opinions from outside sources, resulting in a kind of tunnel vision that sees no need to change practices. Structurally then, governments have become risk averse to the point where trying and failing at something new in good faith is discouraged. SITRA argues that these qualities have left governments unable to be proactive, and only capable of muddling through, which will not hold up in the face of rapid change, such as is facing the Arctic. They offer three ideas for making a government "strategically agile": resource fluidity (as in, people and funds moving between departments easily), strategic sensitivity (good dialogue and incentivized ambition), and collective commitment (shared agendas and the like).

So can Finnish or, for that matter, American strategy appropriately deal with the problems facing the Arctic? Do they show, as the article calls it, "strategic agility"? Or do they reinforce the same old systems and thus are incapable of addressing future challenges? Well that's a silly little trick I did, asking a question implying there's some high stakes to finding the answer when I already have a strong opinion on the matter! I tend to think that despite the holistic nature of most countries' Arctic strategies that they are still too tied to the old systems of the nation state to be truly appropriate for the Arctic and the transnational problems therein. At least, this opinion has been reinforced by SITRA's (Mikko Kosonen and Yves Doz really) article on the issue.

From what I can see now reading the texts is that though there is some experimentation on governance with the inclusion of many different levels of players and more extra-Arctic involvement, there is still a strong desire on the part of the Arctic states to focus on sovereignty issues. What's more, the structure of the government strategies for both Finland and the United States seem to go against the recommendations laid out by SITRA in their vision of governments for the future. The United States' approach is highly decentralized with something like 20+ agencies involved. There is some effort, as laid out in the US's implementation plan, to unify the efforts of the agencies involved, but there is nothing in there about how resources will be allocated, and the United States government is notorious for inter-bureaucracy turf wars. So perhaps they have one of the three. But they talk of cooperation between agencies all the time and who nows how it's going? Finland, too (and the article specifically looks at the case of Finland though not specifically for its Arctic strategy) has locked in ministries with little shared agenda, little incentives for changing jobs, and less of a robust dialogue to promote change. But, it seems they are making more efforts to change this and have more of a sense of urgency than the United States does, especially on the Arctic. I would think they even out, but Finland's government, being smaller and with less divisive issues, should be able to move quicker.

This is my initial impression, but I hope to learn more and incorporate this idea of strategic agility into my paper on this subject.

Wednesday, October 15, 2014

Beginning thoughts on Finnish and American strategy

A Fulbrighter in Rovaniemi

This will serve as an introduction to my work here in Rovaniemi. I'm a Fulbright Fellow working at the Arctic Centre on a project comparing Finnish and American Arctic strategies with the aim to find out if there are any lessons that can possibly inform the American government going forward on its burgeoning engagement with the Arctic region.

Why Compare the Two Though?

There couldn't be much more different between the countries, the USA, a superpower with global interests, and Finland, a small country trying to navigate a place for itself between Russia, the EU, and the global economy. But, in reading the two strategies for the countries, what struck me was that though there has been increasing interest in the US towards the Arctic, it's still very much a periphery, and a secondary, if not tertiary priority for the US government. Finland on the other hand has made the Arctic a high priority for its efforts in both a domestic and foreign policy context.

Stakes for the US

The US, even now, with the chairmanship of the Arctic Council quickly approaching is still struggling to define its focus and level of priority for the Arctic. The Coast Guard's icebreaker "fleet" is small and aging, infrastructure is as sparse as the population of Alaska, and though the US has appointed a new special envoy to the Arctic Council, they have neglected to name an Ambassador to the Arctic as most others have. There is a sense that the USA is neglecting to engage in the Arctic and has come to, as Philip Steinberg puts it in a chapter on US Arctic Policy,  "display the curious mix of disinterest and interest suggested in the two quotations that began this chapter: relative disinterest in the Arctic as a place in itself or as a focal point of U.S. global policy is coupled with a high level of interest in the Arctic as a region in which responses to emergent challenges and opportunities could potentially undermine the global political economic system of which the United States is a world leader." In other words, simply as a region to reinforce the ideas that make the US a superpower, so stability and sovereignty. But I think that simply cleaving to the old system is not enough to properly address issues in the Arctic, which are largely trans-boundary in nature, or to creeping world issues like climate change. A more innovative approach is needed.

Finland's Efforts

Finland, on the other hand, has spelled out an innovative strategy that puts a lot of priority, at least on paper, on the people living in the Arctic. The government has declared the country an Arctic country from top to bottom, rather than a country with an Arctic periphery. Finland, according to the 2013 strategy, wants to be an active Arctic player and establish Arctic know-how to boost its economy and living conditions. There is also a large priority placed on international cooperation. This isn't limited to the Arctic Council, and Finland actively wants to include extra-Arctic players like the EU and Asian countries to better engage the world on Arctic issues. There are, of course, still concerns about this (and all) Arctic strategy. One must ask if the environmental language is mere boilerplate when compared to the business interests. And is including the EU a particularly wise move when it seems that most Arctic states will resist such a move and strain the atmosphere of consensus? Speaking with professor Lassi Heininen too, an expert on Finnish policies in the Arctic, he expressed frustration with aspects of the strategy, such as too many differing priorities, and the knock on effects of declaring all of Finland an Arctic country. For instance, if all of Finland is Arctic, then why bother staying in Lapland to work on Arctic issues? But issues aside, I think that this innovative strategy and its implementation can give the US some ideas as it struggles to define its Arctic interests, and I will be writing about it in this space as my research progresses.